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PREFACE 
T h i s  working p a p e r  c o n t a i n s  f i r s t l y ,  a  r e v i s e d  v e r s i o n  of  
a  paper  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  j o i n t  IIASA - IASI/CNR - IRPET Confer-  
ence  i n  F l o r e n c e  i n  A p r i l  1980. I t  a l s o  c o n t a i n s  a  r e p o r t  on 
a  gaming e x p e r i m e n t ,  r e l a t e d  t o  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  c a r r i e d  o u t  
a t  t h i s  c o n f e r e n c e .  
A v e r y  s i m i l a r  gaming exper iment  was c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  Lund, 
i n  Southern  Sweden w i t h  Swedish w a t e r  p l a n n e r s  i n  November, 1979. 
T h i s  game i s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  IIASA1s Working Paper  WP-80-38. Both 
gaming e x p e r i m e n t s  i n  t u r n  r e f e r  t o  a  s t u d y  on w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  
p l a n n i n g  i n  Western Skane,  Sweden. The a c t u a l  p l a n n i n g  s i t u a t i o n  
a s  w e l l  a s  c e r t a i n  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  problems invo lved  i n  a l l o c a t i n g  
c o s t s  i n  j o i n t  w a t e r  p r o j e c t s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  a n o t h e r  IIASA 
Working Paper ,  WP-79-77. 
The gaminq exper iment  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h i s  paper  i s  concerned 
n o t  o n l y  w i t h  d e v e l o p i n s  methods f o r  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g ,  b u t  a l s o  
more g e n e r a l l y ,  w i t h  d e v e l o p i n g  gaming a s  a  sys tems  a n a l y s i s  
t o o l .  The p l a y i n q  o f  v i r t u a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  games i n  d i f f e r e n t  
c o u n t r i e s ,  i s  one o f  t h e  f o c a l  p o i n t s  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  IIASA 
r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t  on  gamina, p r e s e n t e d  i n  IIASA1s Working 
Paper  WP-79-30. 
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ABSTRACT 
F i r s t l y ,  t h e  c o n c e p t s  of game s i t u a t i o n s ,  game, game t h e o r y ,  
t h e o r y  of  game p l a y i n g  and gaming a r e  i n t r o d u c e d .  Game t h e o r y  
and gaming a r e  p r e s e n t e d  a s  sys tem a n a l y s i s  t o o l s ,  complementing 
each  o t h e r ,  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of  d e c i s i o n s  i n  game s i t u a t i o n s .  
Next ,  t h e  g r e a t  amount of  game s i t u a t i o n s  e x i s t i n g  i n  
r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  a r e  d i s c u s s e d .  An a t t e m p t  a t  a  taxonomy i s  
g i v e n ,  t o  i n d i c a t e  what k ind  of  models can be  b r o u g h t  i n  from 
o t h e r  a r e a s .  Some examples of d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  g i v e n .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  game t h e o r y  and gaming t o  a  
s p e c i f i c  problem, namely c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  i n  r e g i o n a l  w a t e r  r e -  
s o u r c e s  management, i s  d i s c u s s e d  and a  s m a l l  game is p r e s e n t e d .  
The p l a y i n g  of  t h i s  game i n  I t a l y  by Tuscan r e g i o n a l  p l a n n e r s  
i s  p r e s e n t e d ,  and t h e  outcome of  t h i s  gaming exper iment  i s  com- 




2 .  GAME SITUATIONS I N  REGIONAL PLANNING 
3. A GAMING EXPERIMENT ON REGIONAL PLANNING 
3 . 1  Game T h e o r e t i c a l  A s p e c t s  of C o s t  A l l o c a t i o n  
3 . 2  Game on C o s t  A l l o c a t i o n  
3 . 3  T h e  P l a y i n g  of t h e  Game i n  I t a l y  
3 . 4  C o m p a r i s o n  o f  Methods a n d  E x p e r i m e n t a l  R e s u l t s  
3 . 5  C o m m e n t s  on t h e  O u t c o m e  of t h e  Game 
3 . 6  Ideas fo r  F u t u r e  R e s e a r c h  
4 .  APPENDIX 
5. REFERENCES 
THE APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY AND 
GAMING TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION I N  
REGIONAL PLANNING 
INTRODUCTION 
I n  r e g i o n a l  p lanning t h e r e  e x i s t ,  j u s t  a s  i n  many o t h e r  
a r e a s  of economic l i f e ,  a  g r e a t  many d e c i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  
which a  p a r t i c u l a r  f e a t u r e  i s ,  t h a t  some d e c i s i o n m a k e r s  a r e  
s t r a t e g i c a l l y  dependent on o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  makers. This  f e a t u r e  
makes it s u i t a b l e  t o  s o r t  o u t  t h e s e  d e c i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n s  separa te - '  
l y ,  c a l l i n g  them game s i t u a t i o n s .  The d e c i s i o n  maker can i n  
t h e s e  game s i t u a t i o n s ,  by a l lowing  t h e  qame s i t u a t i o n  t o  be mod- 
e l e d  a s  a  game, be a ided-by  methods such a s  game theo ry ,  t heo ry  
of game p l ay ing  and gaming. 
Some new concepts  have been in t roduced  he re .  I t  i s ,  t he re -  
f o r e ,  important  t o  d e f i n e  t h e s e  concepts .  I t  should be s t r e s s e d  
from t h e  outcome t h a t  t h e r e  i s  g r e a t  confusion a s  t o  terminology 
i n  t h i s  a r e a ,  and t h a t  t h e  system o f  d e f i n i t i o n  p re sen ted  below 
i s  n o t  i n  gene ra l  accep tance ,  b u t  n e i t h e r  i s  any o t h e r  terminol-  
ogy i n  t h i s  area.* 
Let  us  f i r s t  d e f i n e  a  "game s i t u a t i o n " .  This  i s  a  d e c i s i o n  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t h e  a c t i o n s  of t h e  s t u d i e d  d e c i s i o n  maker w i l l  
n o t i c e a b l y  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  pay-off of  some o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  maker, 
whose d e c i s i o n  i n  t u r n  w i l l  n o t i c e a b l y  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  pay-off of  
t h e  f i r s t  d e c i s i o n  maker. I f  t h i s  i n f l u e n c e  t o  some e x t e n t  i s  
n e g a t i v e ,  i . e . ,  when one p a r t y ' s  pay-off goes up,  t h e  o t h e r  o n e ' s  
w i l l  go down, we have a  " c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n " .  
*For a  d i s c u s s i o n  of  terminology i n  t h i s  a r e a ,  s e e  ~ t z h l  
(1979) .  
T h i s  i s  no doub t ,  t h e  most impor tan t  t y p e  o f  game s i t u a t i o n .  
There is,  however, a l s o  a n o t h e r  group o f  game s i t u a t i o n s ,  namely 
" coo r d ina t i on  s i t u a t i o n s " .  Take, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  two pe r sons  on 
each s i d e  o f  a  doo r ,  moveable i n  bo th  d i r e c t i o n s .  I f  bo th  pe r -  
s ons  push o r  bo th  p u l l ,  bo th  a r e  worse o f f ;  i f  one p u l l s  and 
t h e  o t h e r  one pushes ,  bo th  a r e  b e t t e r  o f f .  
The t h e o r e t i c a l  problem w i t h  game s i t u a t i o n s  i s  t h a t  one 
pe rson  canno t  s imply  o p t i m i z e ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  a t  l e a s t  one 
o t h e r  pe r son  t r y i n g  t o  o p t i m i z e  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  and t hen  w i l l  
i n f l u e n c e  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  one .  Hence, t h e  d e c i s i o n  
problem i n  game s i t u a t i o n s  must be  s t u d i e d  more c a r e f u l l y  by 
methods such a s  game t h e o r y ,  t h e o r y  of  game p l a y i n g  and gaming. 
~ l l  t h e s e  t h r e e  methods, t o  which w e  s h a l l  r e t u r n  w i t h  d e f i -  
n i t i o n s  i n  a  moment, commonly d e a l  w i t h  a model o f  t h e  gaming 
s i t u a t i o n ,  i . e . ,  an a b s t r a c t  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  main f e a t u r e s  
of t h e  gaming s i t u a t i o n .  Hence, t h e  s i n g l e  word "game" i s  used 
i n  t h e  s p e c i a l  s e n s e  o f  be ing  t h e  more p r e c i s e  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  i n -  
c l u d i n g  t h e  " r u l e s  o f  t h e  qame", e tc . ,  o f  t h e  game s i t u a t i o n  
t h a t  one might  want t o  s t udy .  
Hence, t h e  game c h e s s  can ,  e . g . ,  be seen  a s  a  model,  a l -  
though c r u d e ,  o f  t h e  game s i t u a t i o n  "wa r f a r e  i n  P e r s i a  1000 B.C."  
and t h e  game Monopoly a s  a  model, j u s t  a s  c r u d e ,  o f  t h e  game 
s i t u a t i o n , " r e a l  e s t a t e  d e a l i n g s  i n  N e w  York i n  t h e  t h i r t i e s " .  
Now, game t h e o r y  i s  one s p e c i a l  t h e o r y  f o r  s t u d y i n g  games, 
namely t h a t  t h e o r y  which p resupposes  some k ind  o f  r a t i o n a l  be- 
h a v i o r  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  game p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  i . e . ,  t h e  a c t o r s  
assumed i n  t h e  game. T h i s  r a t i o n a l i t y  i n c l u d e s ,  f i r s t  o f  a l l ,  
t h e  assumpt ions  o f  r a t i o n a l  behav io r  i n  a  n o n - c o n f l i c t  o r  non- 
game s i t u a t i o n ,  i - e . ,  a  r a t i o n a l i t y  which i m p l i e s  o p t i m i z a t i o n .  
To t h e s e  b a s i c  assumpt ions  a r e  added assumpt ions  t h a t  s p e c i f i c -  
a l l y  r e f e r  t o t h e  game s i t u a t i o n ,  i n v o l v i n g  assumpt ions  o f  c o r r e c t  
e x p e c t a t i o n s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e  assume t h a t  eve ry  p a r t y  r e a l i z e s  
t h a t  a l l  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  a r e  r a t i o n a l  o p t i m i z e r s .  
There  a r e  i n  some s i t u a t i o n s , h o w e v e r ,  r e a s o n s  t o  be  scep- 
t i c a l  abou t  t h e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e  game t h e o r e t i c  concep t s  n o t  o n l y  
a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  u se  of  t h e  t h e o r y  f o r  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  of  what w i l l  
happen, b u t  a l s o  f o r  u s i n g  t h e  t h e o r y  i n  a  normat ive  s e n s e ,  f o r  
a d v i c e  on what one s h a l l  do. T h i s  s c e p t i c i s m  i s  p a r t l y  due  t o  
gaming, i . e . ,  t o  s t u d i e s  of how peop le  a c t u a l l y  have behaved when 
p l a y i n g  games. W e  w i l l  soon r e t u r n  t o  t h e  concep t  o f  gaming, 
b u t  it shou ld  be mentioned h e r e ,  t h a t  i n  some games, i n t e l l i g e n t  
d e c i s i o n  makers,  having arhple time f o r  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  and h i g h  
m o t i v a t i o n  t o  p l a y  w e l l ,  have p layed  c o n s i s t e n t l y  c o n t r a r y  t o  
what game t h e o r y  s u g g e s t s .  Hence, p a r a l l e l  t o  game t h e o r y ,  t h e r e  
i s  s low ly  evo lv ing  what I would l i k e  t o  c a l l  h e r e  " a  t h e o r y  of  
game p l ay ing" .  
To t h i s  one  a s s i g n s  a l l  t h e o r y  abou t  game p l a y i n g ,  bo th  
game t h e o r y  and a  t h e o r y  r e g a r d i n g  p a r t i e s  who a r e  n o t  f u l l y  
" r a t i o n a l "  i n  t h e  way w e  have d e f i n e d  game t h e o r e t i c  r a t i o n a l i t y  
above. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  assumpt ions  r e g a r d i n g  c o r r e c t  expec- 
t a t i o n s  a r e  v i o l a t e d .  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  t h e o r y  would 
be f a r  less b u i l t  on axioms o r  on a  s m a l l  set  of  s p e c i f i c  be- 
h a v i o r a l  assumpt ions  than  game t h e o r y  j u s t  d i s c u s s e d .  The new 
t h e o r y  would r e l y  more on " h e u r i s t i c s "  i . e . ,  s imple  r u l e s  o f  
thumb r a t h e r  than  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  game t he o ry .  
The d i f f e r e n c e  between "game t h e o r y "  and t h e  more g e n e r a l  
" t h e o r y  of game p l ay in g "  can e . g . ,  be e x e m p l i f i e d  by c he s s .  Here 
game t h eo r y  can ,  u s i n g  one of  t h e  o l d e s t  theorems i n  game t h e o r y ,  
( t h a t  of  Zermelo, 1 9 1 1 ) ,  o n l y  s a y  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  s o l u t i o n  i n  
t h e  form of  an e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t  i n  s o - c a l l e d  " p u r e  s t r a t e g i e s " .  
T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an op t im a l  c h e s s  p l a y i n g  program 
which does  n o t  u s e  any random d e v i s e  i n  choos ing  t h e  moves. The 
o p t i m a l  program would t h u s  be  comple te ly  d e t e r m i n i s t i c .  
~ f  we look a t  t h e  " t h e o r y  o f  c h e s s  p l a y i n g " ,  f o r  example, 
developed f o r  t h e  computer c h e s s  proqrams,  we have t h a t  s u c c e s s f u l  
computer c h e s s  programs, winning ahampionship tournaments  a g a i n s t  
o t h e r  computer c h e s s  programs,have t o  i n v o l v e  random e lements .  
For  i n s t a n c e ,  a  random number might  de t e rm ine  whether  t h e  com- 
p u t e r  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  move t h e  queen two s t e p s  o r  
t h r e e  s t e p s .  Hence, t h e  c h e s s  s t r a t e g y  chosen w i l l  - n o t  be a  so- 
c a l l e d  pure  s t r a t e g y .  
The reason  f o r  t h i s  random c ho i c e  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :  The com- 
p u t e r  can o n l y  l o o k ,  e . g . ,  a  ha nd fu l  number o f  moves ahead,  s a y  
n  moves.* I f  t h e  program w e r e  comple te ly  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  t h e  op- 
ponent  co u ld  always g e t  t h e  c h e s s  p l a y i n g  computer i n t o  a  t r a p  
by t h i n k i n g  n  + 1 o r  n  + 2 moves ahead.  Because o f  t h e  random 
c h o i c e s ,  t h e  computer w i l l  n o t  be comple te ly  p r e d i c t a b l e  and can 
hence n o t  a s  e a s i l y  be f o o l e d  i n t o  a  t r a p .  
Le t  u s  n e x t  go back t o  o u r  f i n a l  c o n c e p t ,  namely t h a t  of  
qaminq. Gaming i m p l i e s  t h e  a c t u a l  p l a y i n g  o f  a  game, i . e ,  t h a t  
a c t u a l  human b e in g s  p l a y  t h e  game, o f t e n  p o r t r a y i n g  a  r e a l  game 
s i t u a t i o n .  
W e  can d i s t i n g u i s h  between game exper iments  and gaming, 
u s i n g  t h e  f i r s t  word f o r  v e r y  s imple  games which do n o t  t o  any 
e x t e n t  t r y  t o  p o r t r a y  any game s i t u a t i o n  e x i s t i n g  i n  r e a l i t y  
and which g e n e r a l l y  do n o t  i nvo lve  any i n t e r a c t i v e  s i m u l a t i o n .  
We s h a l l  hence r e s e r v e  t h e  word "gaming" f o r  " i n t e r a c t i v e  s imula-  
t i o n ,  w i t h  more t h a n  one  p l a y e r  i n  a  game a t t e m p t i n g  t o  p o r t r a y  
t h e  main f e a t u r e s  o f  some r e a l  game s i t u a t i o n " .  
I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  it s h a l l  be mentioned t h a t  gaming can mainly 
be d i v i d e d  i n t o  two s e p a r a t e  forms,  r i g i d  r u l e  gaming and f r e e  
form gaming. 
*See,  e . g . ,  B e r l i n e r  (1973) 
I n  r i g i d  r u l e  gaming, t h e  game i s  p r e c i s e l y  fo rmula ted  p r i o r  
t o  t h e  s t a r t  of  t h e  gaming, i . e . ,  t h e  model of  t h e  game s i t u a t i o n  
i n  t h e  form o f  r u l e s ,  pay-off t a b l e s ,  e t c . ,  is  c o n s t r u c t e d ,  usu- 
a l l y  by a  game c o n s t r u c t o r ,  p r i o r  t o  t h e  p l ay ing  of  t h e  game. 
In s o - c a l l e d  f r e e  form gaming, t h e  game, i . e . ,  t h e  model of 
t h e  game s i t u a t i o n ,  i s  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  c o n s t r u c t e d  by t h e  p a r t i -  
c i p a n t s  d u r i n g  t h e  a c t u a l  gaming e x e r c i s e .  Hence t h e  model 
b u i l d i n g  i s  p a r t l y  c a r r i e d  o u t  by t h e  gaming p a r t i c i p a n t s .  The 
r o l e  of  t h e  game c o n s t r u c t o r  might  o n l y  be t o  p r e s e n t  vaguely  
t h e  game s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  s h a l l  be modeled. 
W e  s h a l l  mainly  d e a l  w i th  r i g i d  form games h e r e ,  s i n c e  t h e y  
a r e  g e n e r a l l y  of  t h e  g r e a t e s t  i n t e r e s t  f o r  t h e  s p e c i f i c  t y p e  o f  
o p e r a t i o n a l  games t h a t  w e  s h a l l  work a t  l a t e r .  A s  unders tood  
from t h e  comments r e g a r d i n g  t h e  t h e o r y  of game p l a y i n g ,  one of  
t h e  purposes  of gaming i s  t o  h e l p  move towards  a  more r e a l i s t i c  
and r e l e v a n t  t h e o r y  of  game p l a y i n g ,  away from game t h e o r y  i n  
t h o s e  i n s t a n c e s  where t h i s  t h e o r y  ha s  f a i l e d .  One method of de- 
t e rmin ing  when game t h e o r y  i s  v a l i d  i s ,  a s  mentioned,  gaming. 
I f  one,  by r e p e a t e d  gaming, a l l owin  v a r i o u s  key v a r i a b l e s  
a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  se t -up  (Co v a r y ,  h a s  been unab le  t o  
g e t  t h e  p l a y e r s  t o  p l a y  accord ing  t o ,  o r  even wanting t o  p l a y  
accord ing  t o  game t h e o r y ,  one would probably  be  w i s e  t o  q u e s t i o n  
t h e  fundamental  assumpt ions  of  t h i s  game t h e o r y  r a t h e r  t h a n  seek- 
i n g  t o  app ly  t h e  t h e o r y  d i r e c t l y  i n  p r a c t i c e .  When look ing  f o r  
a l t e r n a t i v e  assumpt ions  one can then  be  a i d e d  by s t u d y i n g  t h e  
a c t u a l  game behav ior .  
There  a r e  f o r  many games, s e v e r a l  competing game t h e o r e t i c  
concep t s  l e a d i n g  t o  d i f f e r e n t  s o l u t i o n s .  Gaming can t h e n  be  used 
a s  an a i d  i n  choosing between t n e s e  d i f f e r e n t ,  competing game the -  
o r e t i c  concep ts .  W e  s h a l l  below look more c l o s e l y  a t  how gaming 
can be used t o  compare some d i f f e r e n t  game t h e o r e t i c  concep t s  i n  
a  game d e p i c t i n g  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of  c o s t  f o r  wa t e r  r e s o u r c e s  t o  
d i f f e r e n t  r e g i o n s  o r  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  
Fur thermore ,  some game t h e o r e t i c  concep t s  p r e s e n t  a  l a r g e  
set of e q u a l l y  l i k e l y  s o l u t i o n s .  Gaming can a l s o  be  used f o r  
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between t h e  d i f f e r e n t  s o l u t i o n s  p r e sen t ed  by one 
s p e c i f i c  game t h e o r e t i c  concep t .  
~t should  be  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  gaming i n  i t s  t u r n ,  g r e a t l y  re- 
l i e s  on game t h e o r e t i c  concep ts  a s  concerns  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  
t h e  r u l e s  of  t h e  game, and t h e  s e t t i n g  up of  t h e  hypotheses  t o  
be t e s t e d .  I t  a l s o  p r o v i d e s  a  language f o r  a n a l y s i n g  t h e  gaming 
p roces s .  
W e  can hence see game t h e o r y  and gaming a s  complementing 
each o t h e r  and t o g e t h e r  p rov id ing  an impor tan t  sys tems a n a l y s i s  
t o o l  f o r  s t udy ing  a c t u a l  game s i t u a t i o n s .  
GAME SITUATIONS I N  REGIONAL PLANNING 
The ques t ion  n e x t  a r i s e s  a s  t o  whether t h e s e  methods a r e  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  d e c i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n s o f  i n t e r e s t  f o r  r e g i o n a l  p lan-  
ning.  The ques t ion  is:  Do game s i t u a t i o n s r e a l l y  e x i s t  i n  r e -  
g i o n a l  p lanning? 
The answer i s  yes .  Some examples w i l l  be used t o  i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  t h i s  i s  very  much t h e  case .  We s h a l l  p r e s e n t  t h e s e  examples 
i n  t h e  framework of a  very  p re l imina ry  taxonomy of game s i t u a t i o n s  
i n  r e g i o n a l  p lanning i n  o r d e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of 
g e n e r a l i s i n g  o u t  of t h e  examples. 
The main purpose of t h i s  a t t empt  a t  a  taxonomy i s  t o  make 
it somewhat e a s i e r  t o  s ee  what kind of game t h e o r y ,  o r  o t h e r  
type  of t h e o r y ,  one could b r ing  from o t h e r  a r e a s  of s t u d y ,  mainly 
t h e  economics of  market behavior .  
W e  s h a l l  f i r s t  d i s t i n g u i s h  between h o r i z o n t a l  and v e r t i c a l  
game s i t u a t i o n s :  
I n  h o r i z o n t a l  - game s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e  main p a r t  of t h e  game 
t a k e s  p l ace  between d i f f e r e n t  r eq ions  on t h e  same d e c i s i o n  l e v e l ,  
i . e .  , of t h e  same s t a t u s  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  h i e r a rchy .  I n  t h i s  con- 
n e c t i o n ,  it should be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  w e  s h a l l  use  t h e  word region 
he re  i n  t h e  s imple  sense  of a  s e p a r a t e l y  adminis te red  qeographi-  
c a l  a r e a .  A reg ion  can hence be e i t h e r  a  county,  a  c i t y  o r  a  
mun ic ipa l i t y .  Hence, t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  games concern,  e . g . ,  games 
between c o u n t i e s ,  o r  games between c i t i e s  o r  games between muni- 
c i p a l i t i e s .  
V e r t i c a l  games t o  which w e  s h a l l  r e t u r n  l a t e r ,  involve  game 
s i t u a t i o n s ,  where t h e  d e c i s i o n s  of t h e  s t u d i e d  reg ion  a r e  a f f e c -  
t e d  by d e c i s i o n  u n i t s  p laced on some s c a l e  e i t h e r  "above" o r  
"below" t h i s  s t u d i e d  reg ion .  
The h o r i z o n t a l  c o n f l i c t s  can be seen a s  a r i s i n g  from much 
t h e  same reasons  a s  why pure  compet i t ion w i l l  n o t  g e n e r a l l y  l e a d  
t o  a  s o c i a l l y  op t imal  s o l u t i o n ,  i . e . ,  t h e  main causes  a r e  so- 
c a l l e d  e x t e r n a l  diseconomies and economies of s c a l e . *  
The word e x t e r n a l  diseconomies r e f e r s  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  one 
region w i l l  ga in  by t a k i n g  a c t i o n s  t h a t  w i l l  a f f e c t  ano the r  
reg ion  nega t ive ly .  P o l l u t i o n  i s  a  good example; o f t e n  one w i l l  
f i n d  t h a t  p o l l u t i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  w i l l  be l o c a t e d  a t  t h e  ve ry  borders  
t o  o t h e r  reg ions .  I f  you l e t  a  region a l s o  s t and  f o r  a  count ry  
and l e t  p o l l u t i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  be exempl i f ied  by n u c l e a r  p l a n t s ,  
a  good example i s  provided i f  you look a t  a  map of  nuc l ea r  in -  
s t a l l a t i o n s  i n  Europe. 
The o t h e r  r eg ion ,  wi th  a  p o l l u t i n g  p l a n t  on i t s  border ,  w i l l  
t a k e  a c t i o n ,  e . g . ,  by i t s e l f  l o c a t i n g  o r  a t  l e a s t t h r e a t e n i n g  t o  
l o c a t e  p o l l u t i n g  p l a n t s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  border  of t h e  f i r s t  reg ion .  
*See f u r t h e r ,  e . g . ,  Qu i rk  and Saposnick (1968) .  
The a c t i o n  of  one  r e g i o n  w i l l  be  dependent  on what one  b e l i e v e s  
t h e  o t h e r  r e g i o n  w i i l  do. 
For  t h e  s t u d y  of  t h e s e  problems,  concern ing  f a i r l y  s i m i l a r  
u n i t s ,  t h e  d e b a t e  i n  game t h e o r y  r e g a r d i n g  whe the r  one  shou ld  
a p p l y  s o - c a l l e d  c o o p e r a t i v e  o r  non-coopera t ive  game t h e o r y  becomes 
fundamenta l .  Is it p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  r e g i o n s  t o  e n f o r c e  coopera-  
t i o n ?  A r e  t h e r e  t o o  many f o r  t h i s ?  Have t h e y  g o t  p o s s i b i l i t e s  
t o  compensate,  by s o - c a l l e d  s i d e  payments-- that  i s  a  k ind  of  
b r ibe - - those  r e g i o n s ,  who o t h e r w i s e  would g a i n  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  
l i t t l e  by c o o p e r a t i o n  and hence by more r e l u c t a n t  t o  c o o p e r a t e ?  * 
AS r e g a r d s  t h e  economies o f  s c a l e ,  w e  have t h e  c a s e  when 
e . g . ,  two r e g i o n s  can  produce  a  c e r t a i n  amount o f  services o r  
goods more c h e a p l y  t o g e t h e r  i n  a  j o i n t  p l a n t  t h a n  i f  e a c h  r e g i o n  
produced on i t s  own f o r  o n l y  i t s  own r e q u i r e m e n t s .  One example 
is h o s p i t a l s  run  by s e v e r a l  r e g i o n s ;  a n o t h e r  example i s  j o i n t l y  
owned f a c i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s  f i e l d ,  e . g . ,  w a t e r  pro-  
d u c t i o n .  One game s i t u a t i o n  a r i s e s  h e r e  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  problem. 
L e t  u s  exempl i fy  t h i s  w i t h  t h e  w a t e r  p r o d u c t i o n  example. 
Regions can i n  many c a s e s  g e t  t h e i r  w a t e r  demand f u l f i l l e d  more 
c h e a p l y  by b u i l d i n g  a  j o i n t  f a c i l i t y  t h a n  by b u i l d i n g  s e p a r a t e  
ones .  The amount of  c o s t  s a v i n g s  depends on which r e g i o n s  j o i n  
t o g e t h e r ,  t h e  g r e a t e s t  c o s t  s a v i n g s  o f t e n  r e s u l t i n g  when a d j a c e n t  
r e g i o n s  j o i n  t o g e t h e r .  A problem o f  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  a r i s e s  from 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  f i x e d  c o s t s  o f  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  p l a n t  
canno t  b e  a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e  r e g i o n s  i n  any un ique  way. While b o t h  
r e g i o n s  have a  j o i n t  i n t e r e s t  i n  j o i n i n g  t o g e t h e r ,  t h e y  have op- 
p o s i n g  i n t e r e s t s  a s  t o  how t o  d i v i d e  t h e s e  c o s t  s a v i n g s .  They 
can i n f l u e n c e  t h i s  s h a r e ,  e ; g . ,  by t h r e a t e n i n g  n o t  t o  j o i n ,  t o  
j o i n  w i t h  o t h e r  r e g i o n s  i n s t e a d ,  etc .  W e  s h a l l  l a t e r  r e f e r  t o  
a  more c o n c r e t e  example o f  how t o  s o l v e  t h i s .  
W e  n e x t  t u r n  t o  t h e  v e r t i c a l  game s i t u a t i o n s .  The v e r t i c a l  
game s i t u a t i o n s  c o r r e s p o n d  v e r y  c l o s e l y  t o  v e r t i c a l  models  f o r  
marke t s .  
A d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  v e r t i c a l  models a c c o r d i n g  t o  market  t h e o r y  
- 
would be t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between a )  s i t u a t i o n s  where t h e  s t u d i e d  
r e g i o n  has  o n l y  one c o u n t e r p a r t  on t h e  o t h e r  s i d e ,  and b )  s i t u a -  
t i o n s  where t h e  s t u d i e d  r e g i o n  i s  one o f  many p a r t i e s  on one 
l e v e l  i n  t h e  sys tems  h i e r a r c h y  and c)  where t h e  s t u d i e d  r e g i o n  
i s  a l o n e  on i t s  l e v e l  i n  t h e  sys tems  h i e r a r c h y ,  b u t  h a s  many 
c o u n t e r p a r t s  on t h e  o t h e r  l e v e l . * *  
a .  The most s i m p l e  v e r t i c a l  game i s  o b t a i n e d  where t h e r e  
i s  one r e g i o n  b a r g a i n i n g  w i t h  - one o t h e r  u n i t  on a n o t h e r  l e v e l ,  
e . g . ,  w i t h  t h e  c e n t r a l  government o r  w i t h  a l a r g e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  
*See f u r t h e r ,  e . g . ,  Telser ( 1 9 7 2 ) .  
**See . f u r t h e r ,  e . g . ,  Shubik (1959) and K r e l l e  ( 1 9 6 1 ) .  
Here w e  have something s i m i l a r  t o  what i s  c a l l e d  b i l a t e r a l  mono- 
p o l y  i n  economic t h e o r y ,  a  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  one sel ler  and one  buyer .  
- -
We can s t u d y  such  a  s i t u a t i o n w i t h  p u r e  two pe r son  b a r g a i n i n s  
t h e o r y ,  a  t h e o r y  which i s  wel l -developed ( s e e  S t a h l ,  1 9 7 2 ) .  W e  
c a n ,  e . g . ,  e n v i s a g e  a  l a r g e  c o r p o r a t i o n  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a  con- 
s i d e r a b l e  s i z e  o f  employment i n  t h e  r e g i o n ,  t h r e a t e n i n g  t o  c l o s e  
down a  p l a n t  u n l e s s  it g e t s  a  s t r o n g  s u b s i d y  i n  some form from 
t h e  r e g i o n a l  government.  The s i z e  o f  t h e  s u b s i d y  w i l l  hence be 
s u b j e c t  t o  some h a r d  b a r g a i n i n g .  
b.  Le t  u s  n e x t  l o o k  a t  t h e  c a s e  when t h e  s t u d i e d  r e g i o n  
i s  on t h e  s i d e  w i t h  many p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  s t u d i e d  v e r t i c a l  c o n f l i c t ,  
f a c i n g  one opponent  on t h e  o t h e r  l e v e l  o f  h i e r a r c h y .  T h e o r e t i -  
c a l l y ,  one  c o u l d  compare t h i s  t o  a monopoly-oligopsony s i t u a t i o n  
( i . e . ,  w i t h  - one buyer  and s e v e r a l  sel lers)  w i t h  a  f o c u s  on t h e  
s i d e  o f  t h e  competing buyers .  
I£ w e  o n l y  have a  p u r e  f i g h t  f o r  government g r a n t s ,  w e  have 
a  common budge ta ry  game, wide ly  s t u d i e d  i n  l i t e r a t u r e . *  T h i s  
game h a s  main ly  been s t u d i e d  a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  budget  " i n f i g h t i n g "  
among d i f f e r e n t  government d e p a r t m e n t s ,  where means a r e  a l l o c a t e d  
p a r t l y  on t h e  b a s i s  of a p p r o p r i a t i o n  r e q u e s t s .  The game s i t u a t i o n  
now i s  t h a t  each  r e g i o n  h a s  t o  c o n s i d e r  how much f u n d s  t h e  o t h e r  
r e g i o n s  w i l l  demand. There  might  be  a  g e n e r a l  s l a s h  i n  a p p r o p r i -  
a t i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  a l l  r e g i o n s  i n  a  s i m i l a r  way. The s i z e  o f  t h i s  
s l a s h  w i l l  be dependent  on how much t h e  sum of  t o t a l  r e q u e s t s  
w i l l  go above a v a i l a b l e  funds .  From t h i s  p o i n t  of  v iew,  a  r e g i o n  
w i l l  be unwise i f  it demands c o n s i d e r a b l y  more t h a n  t h e  o t h e r  
r e g i o n s ,  s i n c e  it might  t h e n  become s u b j e c t  t o  e x t r a  i n v e s t i g a -  
t i o n s ,  e t c . ,  p o s s i b l y  r e s u l t i n g  i n  s p e c i a l  budge t  s l a s h e s .  Hence, 
t h e  demands of a  p a r t i c u l a r  r e g i o n  w i l l  b e  made i n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
of  how much one b e l i e v e s  t h e  o t h e r  r e g i o n s  w i l l  demand. T h i s  i n  
t u r n ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  w i l l  depend on what t h e y  b e l i e v e  a b o u t  o n e ' s  
own demands. 
Another  game s i t u a t i o n  i n v o l v i n g  r e g i o n s  and c e n t r a l  govern-  
ment ,  b u t  o f  a  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e ,  i s  t h e  game s i t u a t i o n  
when t h e  government h a s  s p e c i f i c  employment t o  o f f e r ,  e . g . ,  a  
government a g e n t  t o  l o c a t e ,  and d i f f e r e n t  r e g i o n s  s t r u g g l e  t o  
g e t  t h i s  agency.  T h i s  o c c u r r e d  i n  Sweden a  c o u p l e  of y e a r s  a g o ,  
when a  g r e a t  many government a g e n c i e s  i n  Stockholm w e r e  t o  be  
r e l o c a t e d  i n t o  t h e  Swedish c o u n t r y s i d e .  There  was a  g r e a t  con- 
f l i c t  between v a r i o u s  r e g i o n s  a s  t o  which a g e n c i e s  s h o u l d  go t o  
which r e g i o n .  A t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  it would b e  s u i t a b l e  f o r  a  r e g i o n  
n o t  o n l y  t o  p r e s e n t  t h e  r e g i o n ' s  n e e d s ,  b u t  a l s o  stress t h e  
r e g i o n ' s  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and o f f e r  c o n c r e t e  advan tages .  The game 
w i l l  hence concern  more d imensions  t h a n  t h e  s imple  budge t  game. 
A game s i t u a t i o n  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  s t r u g g l e  between r e g i o n s  
o v e r  government a g e n c i e s ,  i s  t h e  game when r e g i o n s  compete f o r  
some major  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  l o c a t e  a  p l a n t .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  
*See Hofs tede  (1972) . 
needs  of t h e  r e g i o n  no l o n g e r  m a t t e r ,  b u t  it becomes a  s i m p l e  
game of  o u t b i d d i n g  your  c o m p e t i t o r s  by o f f e r i n g  l a r g e r  l o a n s ,  
b e t t e r  t r a i n i n g  of  p e r s o n n e l ,  etc .  However, a  r e g i o n  s h o u l d  n o t  
o f f e r  more t h a n  j u s t  t o  "win" t h e  s t r u g g l e .  W e  g e t  a  b i d d i n g  
game, e x t e n s i v e l y  s t u d i e d  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e * .  Here t h e  a b i l i t y  
t o  g u e s s  what t h e  o t h e r  r e g i o n s  w i l l  o f f e r  becomes c r u c i a l .  
c. W e  n e x t  t u r n  t o  t h o s e  v e r t i c a l  game s i t u a t i o n s  where w e  
can r e g a r d  t h e  r e g i o n  t o  be  t h e  s o l e  d e c i s i o n  maker on t h e  one  
s i d e ,  w i t h  many d e c i s i o n  makers  on t h e  oppos ing  s i d e .  These o t h e r  
d e c i s i o n  makers  c a n ,  e - g . ,  be s m a l l e r  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  land-owners,  
v o t e r s ,  etc.  
An i n t e r e s t i n g  game s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n  i s  what w e  
can c a l l  t h e  l a n d - h o l d e r ' s  game. In  l o c a l  p l a n n i n g ,  when e . g . ,  
b u i l d i n g  a  r o a d ,  a  m u n i c i p a l i t y  migh t  r e q u i r e  g e t t i n g  some l a n d  
p l o t s .  L e t  u s  assume 100 a l r e a d y  h e l d  by p r i v a t e  l a n d  owners.  
One way o f  a q u i r i n g  t h e  l a n d  is  by o r d i n a r y  p u r c h a s e s .  The p r i c e s  
p a i d  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  go up h i g h e r  and h i g h e r ,  a s  t h e r e  a r e  fewer  
and fewer  l a n d - p l o t s  l e f t .  I f ,  f o r  example,  99 l a n d - p l o t s  have 
been bough t ,  t h e  remain ing  1 0 0 t h  l a n d  owner h a s  t h e n  some k i n d  
o f  a  v e t o  on t h e  whole p r o j e c t .  He can  t h e n  o b t a i n  a  v e r y  h i g h  
p r i c e .  
Hence, a t  some s t a g e  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t y  w i l l  
r a t h e r  r e s o r t  t o  e x p r o p r i a t i o n  t h a n  buying a t  t h e s e  v e r y  h i g h  
p r i c e s .  T h i s  e x p r o p r i a t i o n  i s ,  however,  n o t  f r e e  o f  c o s t .  Not 
o n l y  a r e  t h e r e  l e g a l  c o s t s ,  b u t  more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  a l s o  c o s t s  of  
bad w i l l ,  r i s k s  o f  p r o t e s t s  and d i s r u p t i o n s  i n  f a c e  of  e x p r o p r i a -  
t i o n  . Hence, a  r e g i o n  migh t  n o t  want t o  s t a r t  e x p r o p r i a t i n g  a t  
t o o  e a r l y  a  s t a g e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e  land-owners w i l l  gen- 
e r a l l y  f i n d  it e c o n o m i c a l l y  p r o f i t a b l e  t o  b e  t h e  l a s t  one t o  b e  
purchased  p r i o r  t o  t h e  s t a r t  of t h e  e x p r o p r i a t i o n s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
w e  have q u i t e  a  c o m p l i c a t e d  game s i t u a t i o n ,  w i t h  t h e  l a n d  owners 
t r y i n g  t o  g u e s s  when e x p r o p r i a t i o n s  s t a r t  and when o t h e r  l and-  
owners a r e  go ing  t o  s e l l  o u t ,  w h i l e  t h e  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n e r s  must  
t r y  t o  g u e s s  how l o n g  d i f f e r e n t  land-owners a r e  go ing  t o  t r y  t o  
d e l a y  t h e i r  s a l e s .  
~ l t h o u g h  it i s  a  compl ica ted  game s i t u a t i o n ,  it i s  of  re- 
l e v a n c e ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  Sweden, where w e  have been asked t o  t r y  t o  
make a  game t o  s t u d y  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  p a r a l l e l  t o  a  computer sim- 
u l a t i o n  model,  i n v o l v i n g  game t h e o r e t i c  i d e a s .  
I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  it shou ld  be  mentioned t h a t  many gaming 
a c t i v i t i e s  d e a l  w i t h  l a n d  usage  p l a n n i n g ,  and s i m i l a r  p l a n n i n g  
such  a s  urban zoning p l a n n i n g  e t c .  Most games used i n  t h e s e  a r e a s  
a r e ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  games f o c u s s e d  on h e r e ,  of t h e  f r e e  form 
t y p e .  T h i s  means t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  i n  t h e s e  c a s e s ,  s m a l l e r  p o s s i b i l -  
i t i e s  o f  u s i n g  game t h e o r y  a s  a  complement t o  gaming. These t y p e s  
of games a r e  t h e r e f o r e ,  o f  somewhat less i n t e r e s t  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  
purpose .  S i n c e  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  e x c e l l e n t  books i n  t h i s  a r e a ,  
*See ,  e . g . ,  Amihud (1976) and Ponssa rd  (1977) c h a p t e r  3 .  
w e  s h a l l  n o t  d e a l  f u r t h e r  w i t h  t h e s e  k i n d s  o f  games.* 
F i n a l l y ,  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  game o f  t h e  r e g i o n a l  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r  
when a g a i n s t  t h e  v o t e r ,  w e  a r r i v e  a t  a  s p e c i a l  k i n d  o f  game, i f  
w e  a l l o w  t h e  r e g i o n a l  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s  t o  i n  t u r n  b e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  
s e v e r a l  g r o u p s ,  i . e . ,  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  The f o c u s  o f  t h e  game 
t h e n  s h i f t s  from t h e  v e r t i c a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  be tween  government  and  
o t h e r  p a r t i e s  t o w a r d s  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  s t r u g g l e  between t h e  p a r t i e s .  
W e  t h e n  have  a  well-known p o l i t i c a l  game much d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  i n  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e . * *  The p rob lem f o r  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  
i s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  on  which  v o t e r s  a  p a r t y  s h a l l  
f o c u s  i t s  i n t e r e s t  and  h e n c e ,  what o p i n i o n  a  p a r t y  s h a l l  have  on 
c e r t a i n  i s s u e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  maximize i t s  v o t e s .  
L e t  u s  l i m i t  o u r s e l v e s  t o  t h e  s t u d y  o f  one  p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e .  
L e t  u s  assume t h a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n v o l v e d  h e r e ,  p r i o r  t o  d e c l a r i n g  
t h e i r  o p i n i o n ,  have  e q u a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  a t t r a c t i n g  t h e  v o t e r s .  
The q u e s t i o n  i s  t h e n ,  where  a  p a r t y  s h o u l d  " l o c a t e "  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  
s t a n d  a l o n g  a  d i m e n s i o n  where t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  v o t e r s  a r e  assumed 
t o  b e  f a i r l y  e v e n l y  d i s t r i b u t e d .  T h i s  h a s  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  been  
compared t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  where t o  l o c a t e  y o u r  ice cream s t a n d  
on a  b e a c h ,  where  t h e  p e o p l e  a r e  w e l l  s p r e a d  o u t  and  w i l l  buy f rom 
t h e  n e a r e s t  ice  cream s t a n d .  Theory  w i l l  t h e n  show t h a t ,  i f  t h e r e  
a r e  two p a r t i e s ,  t h e y  s h o u l d  b o t h  l o c a t e  r i g h t  i n  t h e  m i d d l e .  I f  
t h e r e  a r e  f o u r  p a r t i e s ,  t h e n  two s h o u l d  l o c a t e  a t  t h e  25 p e r  c e n t  
p o i n t  and t h e  o t h e r  two a t  t h e  75 p e r  c e n t  p o i n t .  See  F i g u r e  1. 
2  p a r t i e s  
4 p a r t i e s  
F i g u r e  1. L o c a t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  on an  i s s u e .  
GAME THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF COST ALLOCATION 
AS i n d i c a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  one  a c t u a l  c a s e  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  b o t h  
game t h e o r y  and gaming c o n c e r n s  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  i n  w a t e r  re- 
s o u r c e s  management; i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  S o u t h e r n  Sweden Water  Case  
s t u d i e d  by IIASA. The a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  game t h e o r y  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  
p rob lem was c a r r i e d  o u t  by P. Young, N .  Okada and  T. Hashimoto 
(1979)  . 
"See e . g . ,  Duke (1974)  F e l d t  (1972)  and  i n  I t a l i a n  B o t t a r i  
( 1 9 7 8 ) .  
**See e . g . ,  Brams (1975)  and  Ordeshook ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  
F i r s t ,  t h e i r  work w i l l  be reviewed b r i e f l y .  The q u e s t i o n  
i s  how c o s t s  sh o u l d  be a l l o c a t e d  i n  a  wa t e r  p r o j e c t  when d i f f e r -  
e n t  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  j o i n  t o g e t h e r  t o  deve lop  wa t e r  s u p p l i e s .  The 
c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  problem a r i s e s  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e ,  i n  
g e n e r a l ,  economies o f  s c a l e  i n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  w a t e r  f a c i l i -  
t i e s .  One problem o f  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  such a  c o a l i -  
t i o n  of  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  i s  t h a t  t h e  f i x e d  c o s t s  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
of t h e  p l a n t  c an n o t  be a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  i n  any 
unique way. 
One can o n l y  p ropose  v a r i o u s  p r i n c i p l e s  on which such a l -  
l o c a t i o n s  sh o u l d  depend. S u i t a b l e  p r i n c i p l e s  can be  found,  e. g. , 
i n  game t h eo r y .  One p r i n c i p l e , " i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l i t y " ,  i s  t h a t  
no m u n i c i p a l i t y  s h a l l  pay a  h i g h e r  c o s t  t h a n  it would have t o  
pay,  i f  it w e r e  t o  f u l f i l l  i t s  wate r  needs  comple te ly  on i t s  
own. Another p r i n c i p l e ,  which w e  c a l l  t h e  " f u l l  c o s t "  p r i n c i p l e ,  
i s  t h a t  t o t a l  c o s t s  sh o u l d  b e  covered ,  l e a v i n g  no s u r p l u s  and 
no l o s s  t o  any t h i r d  p a r t y .  I n  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  c a s e ,  w e  s t u d y  a  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  which s i x  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  a r e  i nvo lved ,  and where 
t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  when a l l  s i x  c o o p e r a t e ,  i s  lower t h a n  t h e  t o t a l  
c o s t  o f  any o t h e r  combination.  
B a s i c  r a t i o n a l i t y  p r i n c i p l e s  would t h e n  f u r t h e r  s ay  t h a t  
t h e  "g rand"  c o a l i t i o n  o f  a l l  s i x  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  shou ld  be  formed,  
s i n c e  each  p a r t y  can t h e n  be  i n  a  b e t t e r  s i t u a t i o n  t h a n  it cou ld  
be under  a n o t h e r  ar rangement  i n v o l v i n g  h i g h e r  t o t a l  c o s t s .  
Fur thermore ,  one can add an a d d i t i o n a l  demand, namely "group 
r a t i o n a l i t y " ,  implying t h a t  t h e  sum of payments made by t h e  mem- 
b e r s  of  ev e r y  c o a l i t i o n  which i s  s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h e  g rand  c o a l i -  
t i o n ,  s h ou l d  n o t  be l a r g e r  t han  t h e  c o s t  t h a t  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n  
i n c u r s  i f  i t  i s  working on i t s  own. T h i s  i m p l i e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h a t  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  p a r t i e s  1 , 2 ,  and 3  would n o t  
a g r e e  t o  paying x l t x 2 , x 3 ,  i f  t h e  payments x i  + x2 + x3 a r e h i g h -  
er t h a n  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  would be  t o  t h e s e  t h r e e  p a r t i e s  i f  t h e y  
o n l y  formed t h e  t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  123. 
The set  of  a l l  a l l o c a t i o n s  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  s t a t e d  
above,  ( i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  f u l l  c o s t ,  g r and  c o a l i t i o n ,  g roup  
r a t i o n a l i t y ) ,  a r e  s a i d  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  " t h e  co re " .  I n  some c a s e s ,  
t h e  c o r e  might  n o t  e x i s t ;  i n  many c a s e s ,  l i k e  t h e  one  s t u d i e d  i n  
t h i s  concre te  c a s e ,  it e x i s t s ,  b u t  i s  i n  no way unique.  
There  a r e  s e v e r a l  ways o f  o b t a i n i n g  a  unique a l l o c a t i o n  
w i t h i n  t h e  co r e .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h r e e  a r e  d i s cus sed :  t h e  
Nuc leo lus ,  t h e  P r o p o r t i o n a l  L e a s t  Core ,  and t h e  Weak L e a s t  Core. 
Common t o  a l l  of  t h e s e  co ncep t s  i s  t h a t  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  o b t a i n e d  
by a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  l i n e a r  programming, where one  s e e k s  t o  minimize 
some k i n d  o f  su b s i d y  r a t e  and where one  d e d u c t s  some t rans forma-  
t i o n  of  t h i s  su b s i d y  r a t e  from t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  o f  e ach  c o a l i t i o n .  
The c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  t h e  LP-program, hence ,  imply t h e  r equ i r emen t s  
t h a t  t h e  sum of  t h e  payments made by t h e  members o f  a  s p e c i f i c  
c o a l i t i o n  shou ld  n o t  exceed t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  o f  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n  
minus some t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h i s  subs idy  r a t e .  
The t h r e e  ways o f  o b t a i n i n g  a  c o r e  s o l u t i o n  d i f f e r  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  way t h e  s u b s i d y  r a t e  i s  t r a n s f o r m e d .  The LP- 
program d e t e r m i n e s  a  un ique  v a l u e  o f  t h e  s u b s i d y  r a t e ,  which i n  
t u r n  g i v e s  a  u n i q u e  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n .  The t h r e e  c o r e  c o n c e p t s  
a l s o  d i f f e r  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h e y  s a t i s f y  t h e  so-  
c a l l e d  m o n o t o n i c i t y  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h a t  i f  t o t a l  c o s t s  go  u p ,  no  
p a r t y  s h o u l d  be  c h a r g e d  more. 
A f o u r t h  s o l u t i o n  c o n c e p t  based  on game t h e o r y ,  b u t  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  w i t h i n  t h e  c o r e ,  was a l s o  d i s c u s s e d :  The S h a p l e y  
Value.  One way o f  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h i s  v a l u e  i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
The g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  i s  formed s t e p  by s t e p ;  f i r s t  one  p a r t y  
j o i n s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a n o t h e r  p a r t  t o  form a  two-pa r ty  c o a l i t i o n .  
Then o n e  more p a r t y  i s  added t o  form a  t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n ,  
and t h e n  a n o t h e r  p a r t y  is  added t o  form a  f o u r - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n ,  
e t c . ,  u n t i l  f i n a l l y  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  i s  formed.  T h e r e  a r e  
many ( i n  an n -pe r son  game n ! )  ways o r  o r d e r s  i n  which  such  a  
p r o c e d u r e  c a n  t a k e  p l a c e ,  depend ing  on which  p a r t y  " s i g n s  up" 
f i r s t ,  and  which p a r t y  " s i g n s  up" n e x t .  F o r  e a c h  o r d e r ,  a  p a r t y  
j o i n i n g  a  c o a l i t i o n  i s  t h o u g h t o n l y  t o  pay  t h e  i n c r e m e n t a l  c o s t s  
( i . e . ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  new c o a l i t i o n  and  
t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  one  h e  j o i n s ) .  The S h a p l e y  v a l u e  f o r  e a c h   arty 
i s  t h e n  t h e  p a r t y ' s  a v e r a g e  payments ,  computed o v e r  a l l  n!  c o a l i -  
t i o n  f o r m a t i o n  o r d e r s .  
F i n a l l y ,  a  f i f t h  method was p r e s e n t e d .  T h i s  was a  m o d i f i e d  
v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  S e p a r a b l e  Cost-Remaining B e n e f i t s  (SCRB). T h i s  
method h a s  been  d e v e l o p e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  u s e  i n  
w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  p l a n n i n g .  W e  d e f i n e  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  f o r  a  
p a r t y  a s  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  b e i n g  t h e  l a s t  t o  j o i n  t h e  g r a n d  
c o a l i t i o n .  Next t h e  " r e m a i n i n g  b e n e f i t "  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  be tween t h e  c o s t  i f  t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t y  g o e s  a l o n e  and 
i t s  m a r g i n a l  c o s t s .  The payment made by  a  p a r t y  i s  t h e n  com- 
p u t e d  a s  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  p l u s  i t s  s h a r e  o f  t h e  n o n - a l l o c a t e d  
c o s t s ,  where t h e  s h a r e  i s  se t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p a r t y ' s  s h a r e  
o f  r e m a i n i n g  b e n e f i t s .  
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  r e a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  S o u t h e r n  Sweden, a  
c o s t  t a b l e  f o r  v a r i o u s  c o a l i t i o n s  was computed. A l though  i n  
r e a l i t y  t h e r e  a r e  1 8  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  i n  t h i s  r e g i o n ,  it was 
found p r a c t i c a l  and r e a l i s t i c  t o  g r o u p  t h e s e  i n t o  s i x  u n i t s  
which f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e  can  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a c t i n g  a s  i n d e p e n d e n t  
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  I t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  n o t e  h e r e  t h a t  t h e  symbols  
A,H,K,L,M and T  d e n o t e  t h e  main m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  i n  e a c h  g r o u p ,  
w i t h  L d e n o t i n g   he u n i v e r s i t y  town Lund and M I  MalmB, t h e  
l a r g e s t  c i t y  i n  t h e  r e g i o n .  The j o i n t  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  was t h u s  
computed f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  c o a l i t i o n s t h a t  t h e s e  s i x  muni- 
c i p a l i t y  g r o u p s  c o u l d  form. The r e s u l t s  a r e  i n  t a b l e  1 below,  
where c o s t s  a r e  s y e c i f i e d  i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  Swedish Crowns. 
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  d a t a ,  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n s  w e r e  computed 
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  f i v e  p r o c e d u r e s  d i s c u s s e d  above ,  and a l s o  on 
t h e  b a s i s  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  and  demand. These  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n s  i n  
m i l l i o n s  o f  Swedish Crowns a r e  g i v e n  i n  t a b l e  2 .  
T a b l e  1. T o t a l  C o s t  of e a c h  p o s s i b l e  c o a l i t i o n .  
2 1 . 9 5  AHK 4 0 . 7 4  AHKL 4 8 . 9 5  
1 7 . 0 8  AHL 4 3 . 2 2  AHKM 6 0 . 2 5  
1 0 . 9 1  AHM 5 5 . 5 0  AHKT 6 2 . 7 2  
1 5 . 8 8  AHT 5 6 . 6 7  AHLM 6 4 . 0 3  
2 0 . 8 1  AKL 4 8 . 7 4  AHLT 6 5 . 2 0  
2 1 . 9 8  AKM 5 3 . 4 0  AHMT 7 4 . 1 0  
AKT 5 4 . 8 5  AKLM 6 3 . 9 5  
3 4 . 6 9  ALM 5 3 . 0 5  AKLT 7 0 . 7 2  
3 2 . 8 6  ALT 5 9 . 8 1  ALMT 7 3 . 4 1  
3 7 . 8 3  ANT 6 1 .  36 HKLM 4 8 . 0 7  
4 2 . 7 6  HKL 2 7 . 2 6  HKLT $ 9 . 2 4  
4 3 . 9 3  HKM 4 2 . 5 5  HKMT 5 9 . 3 5  
2 2 . 9 6  HKT 4 4 . 9 4  HLMT 6 4 . 4 1  
2 5 . 0 0  HLM 4 5 . 8 1  KLMT 5 6 . 6 1  
3 7 . 8 9  XLT 4 6 . 9 8  AKMT 7 2 . 2 7  
3 9 . 0 6  Hf4T 5 6 . 4 9  AHKLM 6 9 . 7 6  
2 6 . 7 9  KLM 4 2 . 0 1  AHKMT 7 7 . 4 2  
3 1  - 4 5  KLT 4 8 . 7 7  AHLMT 8 3 . 0 0  
3 2 . 8 9  KMT 5 0 . 3 2  AHKLT 7 0 . 9 3  
3 1 . 1 0  LMT 5 1 . 4 6  AKLMT 7 3 . 9 7  
3 7 . 8 6  HKLMT 6 6 . 4 6  
3 9 . 4 1  
AHKLMT 8 3 . 8 2  
T a b l e  2: A l l o c a t i o n s  i n  M i l l i o n s  of S w e d i s h  C r o w n s  
Method A H K L M T 
S h a p l e y  Va lue  20 .01  1 0 . 7 1  6 .61  10 .37 16.94 1 9 . 1 8  
N u c l e o l u s  20 .35  12 .06  5 .00  8 .61  18 .60  1 9 . 2 1  
P r o p o r t i o n a l  L e a s t  Core  1 9 . 8 1  12.57 4.35 9 . 2 5  19 .85  17 .99  
Weak L e a s t  Core  20 .03  12.52 3.94 9.07 20 .11 18 .15  
S.C.R.B. 19 .54  1 3 . 2 8  5.62 1 0 . 9 0  16.66 17.82 
P o p u l a t i o n  P r o p o r t i o n a l  10 .13  21.00 3 .19  8.22 34.22 7.07 
Demand P r o p o r t i o n a l  13 .33  16.32 7 . 4 3  7 .00  29 .04 1 0 . 6 9  
Comparing t h e s e  two t a b l e s ,  it can  f i r s t  o f  a l l  b e  s e e n  
t h a t  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n s  b a s e d  on p o p u l a t i o n  and  demand v i o l a t e  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of  i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i b n a l i t y ,  f o r  example  f o r  M ,  who 
on h i s  own can  q e t  away w i t h  20 .81  (see t a b l e  1) .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  SCRB and  t h e  S h a p l e y  v a l u e  p r o c e d u r e s  can  
b e  c r i t i c i z e d  b e c a u s e  none  o f  them s a t i s f i e s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
g r o u p  r a t i o n a l i t y .  L e t  u s  l o o k  a t  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  HKL. Accord ing  
t o  t h e  SCRB p r o c e d u r e ,  HKL s h a l l  t o g e t h e r  pay  29 .80  and  a c c o r d -  
i n g  t o  t h e  S h a p l e y  v a l u e  27.69 Shou ld  t h e y  n o t  j o i n  t h e  g r a n d  
c o a l i t i o n ,  b u t  r ema in  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t h e  t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  
HKL, t h e y  would o n l y  have  t o  pay  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n ,  o r  
27.26.  H e n c e , n e i t h e r  t h e  SCRB n o r  t h e  S h a p l e y  v a l u e  b e l o n g  t o  
t h e  c o r e .  
The a u t h o r s  n e x t  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  t h r e e  c o r e  s o l u t i o n s .  They 
a r r i v e  a t  p r e f e r r i n g  t h e  Weak L e a s t  C o r e ,  s i n c e  it i s  o n l y  one  
o f  t h e  t h r e e  which  a l w a y s  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  m o n o t o n i c i t y  p r i n c i p l e  
men t ioned  e a r l i e r .  The N u c l e o l u s  v i o l a t e s  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i n  
t h i s  s p e c i f i c  game; t h e  P r o p o r t i o n a l  L e a s t  C o r e ,  w h i l e  s a t i s -  
f y i n g  t h e  m o n o t o n i c i t y  p r i n c i p l e  i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  game, d o e s  
n o t  f u l f i l l  it i n  a l l  games. 
GAME ON COST ALLOCATION 
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  work ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  
t h e  t a b l e  d e p i c t i n g  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  o f  e a c h  p o s s i b l e  c o a l i t i o n ,  
a  game h a s  been c o n s t r u c t e d . *  The d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  game i s  p r e -  
s e n t e d  i n  t h e  form o f  a  game manual  g i v e n  a s  an  a p p e n d i x .  
A f i r s t  v e r s i o n  o f  t h i s  game was p l a y e d  i n  Lund i n  S o u t h e r n  
Sweden i n  November 1979.  A second  v e r s i o n  was p l a y e d  i n  con- 
n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  j o i n t  IIASA-IASI/CNR-IRPET C o n f e r e n c e  i n  
F l o r e n c e  on  t h e  9 t h  o f  A p r i l  1980.  The d e t a i l s  o f  t h i s  game 
a r e  b e s t  u n d e r s t o o d  by a  s t u d y  o f  t h e  manual  p r e s e n t e d  a s  an 
a p p e n d i x .  T h i s  v e r s i o n  d i f f e r s  o n l y  i n  some s m a l l  d e t a i l s  f rom 
t h e  Lund game. The main d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  i n  t h e  Swedish  game 
w e  d i d  n o t  p r e s e n t  t h e  d a t a  on  p o p u l a t i o n  and w a t e r  demand. 
Ano the r  r a t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  was t h a t  w e  were somewhat 
more l i b e r a l  on t i m e  l i m i t s  i n  t h e  I t a l i a n  game t h a n  i n  t h e  
Swedish game s o  t h a t  t h e  qame would n o t  end  p r e m a t u r e l y .  A less 
i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  was t h a t  t h e  p a y - o f f s  w e r e  i n  l i r a ,  n o t  
Swedish  c rowns .  
The r e a s o n i n g  b e h i n d  t h e  o r i q i n a l  gaming e x c e r c i s e  i s  d i s -  
c u s s e d  a t  l e n g t h  i n  S t a h l  ( 1 9 8 0 ) .  Here i t  s u f f i c e s  t o  m e n t i o n  
t h a t  t h e  main p u r p o s e  was t o  t es t  t h e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e  game 
t h e o r e t i c  c o n c e p t s  d i s c u s s e d  above .  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  Lund 
game which  w e r e  p a r t l y  a t  o d d s  w i t h  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
o f  some o f  t h e s e  qame t h e o r e t i c  c o n c e p t s ,  made it i m p o r t a n t  t o  
p l a y  t h e  game s e v e r a l  more t i m e s ,  p r e f e r a b l y  i n  d i f f e r e n t  coun- 
t r ies  a s  w e l l .  Thus ,  when an  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p l a y  t h e  qame w i t h  
*More d e t a i l s  a b o u t  t h e  game i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  S t a h l  ( 1 9 8 0 ) .  
Tuscan r e g i o n a l  p l a n n e r s  i n  F l o r e n c e  was g i v e n ,  w e  w e r e  happy 
t o  u t i l i z e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y .  
P r i o r  t o  t h e  p l a y i n g  o f  t h e  game i n  Lund,  w e  made a  f o r e -  
c a s t  o f  how t h e  game would b e  p l a y e d  i n  Lund, b a s i n g  t h e  f o r e -  
c a s t  on  how p e o p l e  had  behaved  i n  o t h e r  games. T h i s  f o r e c a s t  
p roved  t o  b e  a l m o s t  a s  good a  p r e d i c t o r  a s  t h e  game t h e o r e t i c  
c o n c e p t s  which g a v e  t h e  b e s t  p r e d i c t i o n ,  namely t h e  S h a p l e y  
V a l u e .  The N u c l e o l u s  g a v e  a l m o s t  a s  good a  p r e d i c t i o n ,  w h i l e  
t h e  L e a s t  Weak C o r e ,  which  a s  i n d i c a t e d  a b o v e ,  was p r e f e r r e d  i n  
t h e  more n o r m a t i v e  game t h e o r e t i c  a n a l y s i s ,  was a  less e f f i c i e n t  
p r e d i c t o r  o f  t h e  a c t u a l  ou tcome i n  Lund. 
S i n c e  t h e  games p l a y e d  i n  Lund and  F l o r e n c e  a r e  v i r t u a l l y  
i d e n t i c a l  and  s i n c e  t h e r e  d i d  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  b e  any  p o s s i b i l i -  
t i e s  o f  s a y i n g  a  p r i o r i  how r e g i o n a l  p l a n n e r s  i n  I t a l y  would 
d i f f e r  f rom r e q i o n a l  p l a n n e r s  i n  Sweden, o u r  f o r e c a s t  was t h a t  
t h e  r e s u l t  would be  t h e  same a s  it would have  been  i n  Sweden i f  
t h e  same t i m e  l i m i t s  had  been  u s e d  a s  i n  t h e  I t a l i a n  game*, 
namely ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n :  A * 21 .15 ,  H = 9 . 7 0 ,  
K = 6 . 0 0 ,  L  = 9 . 1 0 ,  M = 1 8 . 3 7 ,  T  = 19 .50 .  
THE PLAYING OF THE GAME I N  ITALY 
The gaming e x p e r i m e n t  was c a r r i e d  o u t  a t  P a r k  P a l a c e  Hotel, 
i n  F l o r e n c e ,  i n  t h e  e v e n i n g  o f  A p r i l  9 ,  1980 .  The p a r t i c i p a n t s  
had  been hand-p icked  by t h e  IRPET management. They a l l  h a d ,  a s  
f a r  a s  w e  c o u l d  see, a  s u b s t a n t i a l  knowledge a b o u t  r e g i o n a l  
p l a n n i n g .  I n  f a c t ,  some w i e l d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  power w i t h  r e g a r d  
t o  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  i n  Tuscany .  
The game t o o k  p l a c e  a r o u n d  a  s m a l l  t a b l e  w i t h  s e a t s  f a r  t h e  
s i x  p l a y e r s ,  t h e  game l e a d e r  a n d  a n  i n t e r p r e t e r .  I n  o r d e r  t o  
min imize  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  Swedish  game, t h e  
same c o n f i g u r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  p l a y e r s  was u s e d  a s  i n  Sweden. T h i s  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  ( f i g u r e  2 )  i s  shown below.  
I 
Game l e a d e r  
and 
I n t e r p r e t e r  
F i g u r e  2. S e a t i n q  ? I a n  
* I n  Lund, t h e  game was ,  due  t o  more s t r i n g e n t  t i m e  limits, 
broken  up p r i o r t o t h e  r e a c h i n g  o f  an  a g r e e m e n t  on  t h e  g r a n d  
c o a l i t i o n .  S i n c e  s u c h  an. ag reemen t  was b e i n g  d i s c u s s e d  by t h e  
game p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  it  was p o s s i b l e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w i t h i n  f a i r l y  
c l o s e  l i m i t s ,  what  a g r e e m e n t  c o u l d  u l t i m a t e l y  have  been  r e a c h e d  
i f  t h e r e  had  n o t  been  t h i s  t i m e  r e s t r i c t i o n .  T h i s  i s  t h e  d a t a  
u s e d  f o r  t h e  f o r e c a s t  h e r e  (see S t a h l  1 9 8 0 ,  p . 2 1 ) .  
The m u n i c i p a l i t y  r o l e s  w e r e  randomly a l l o t t e d  t o  t h e  s i x  
p l a y e r s .  
The game i n s t r u c t i o n  had been d i s t r i b u t e d  e a r l i e r  t o  t h e  
p l a y e r s ,  b o t h  i n  E n g l i s h  ( i - e . ,  t h e  one  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  appen- 
d i x )  and i n  I t a l i a n .  T h i s  was a l l  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  
game t h a t  was a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a t  t h e  t i m e . *  The 
few q u e s t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  had  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  game 
c o u l d  a l l  be  answered  by r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  manual .  
The game t h e n  s t a r t e d .  A f t e r  a  c a u t i o u s  s t a r t ,  H and L 
approached  e a c h  o t h e r ,  b u t  t h e y  d i d  n o t  form a  c o a l i t i o n ,  
seeming t o  p r e f e r  t o  form a  l a r g e r  c o a l i t i o n  a t  once .  I n s t e a d  
a f t e r  11 m i n u t e s ,  M and T  formed a c o a l i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n  19 .17  t o  M and 20.24 t o  T.** T h i s  d i v i s i o n  i s  r e a c h e d  
when t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  o f  t h e  two p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  MT, 39 .41 ,  i s  
s p l i t  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  c o s t s  o b t a i n e d ,  i f  e a c h  one  had been  
on h i s  own, i. e.  , M pays :  
The game t h e n  f o c u s s e d  on a  more g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  d i v i s i o n .  F o r  example ,  t h e r e  was a  d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  w h e t h e r  t h e  d i v i s i o n  s h o u l d  o n l y  b e  f o c u s s e d  on t h e  c o s t s  
o f  v a r i o u s  c o a l i t i o n s  o r  w h e t h e r  one  s h o u l d  a l s o  t a k e  demand 
and p o p u l a t i o n  f i g u r e s  i n t o  a c c o u n t .  Conce rn ing  t h e  l a t t e r  
t h e r e  was a  problem a s  t o  w h e t h e r  demand o r  p o p u l a t i o n  s h o u l d  
be c o n s i d e r e d ,  o r  i f  one  s h o u l d  u s e  some combina t ion  o f  t h e s e  
two f a c t o r s .  
The d i s c u s s i o n  t h u s  went  o n ,  and  a t  f i r s t ,  t h e r e  was n o t  
even  a  c o n s e n s u s  on w h e t h e r  a  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  s h o u l d  be  formed 
o r  n o t .  A f t e r  46 m i n u t e s  from t h e  b e g i n n i n g ,  t h e r e  was ,  how- 
e v e r ,  a  g e n e r a l  c o n s e n s u s  among t h e  s i x  p l a y e r s ,  t h a t  a  g r a n d  
c o a l i t i o n  s h o u l d  be  formed. The a rgumen t s  c o n c e r n i n g  which 
d i v i s i o n  scheme t o  u s e  l a s t e d  30 minu tes .***  Then an  ag reemen t  
*The o r i g i n a l  v e r s i o n  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  c o n t a i n i n g  e v e r y t h i n g  
up t o  page  1 3 ,  was d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
on t h e  day  a f t e r  t h e  game. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  none  o f  t h e  game p a r t i -  
c i p a n t s  had s e e n  IIASA WP-80- 38 o r  WP-79-77. 
**Al l  p a y - o f f s  a r e  e x p r e s s e d  i n  hundreds  o f  l i r e  t o  make 
compar i sons  w i t h  t h e  t a b l e s  p r e s e n t e d  above e a s i e r .  
***In  t h e  meant ime,  i n  o r d e r  f o r  M and T  n o t  t o  d r o p  o u t  o f  
t h e  game, t h e y  formed a  new c o a l i t i o n  e v e r y  1 5  m i n u t e s ,  w i t h  a  
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  pay-of f  d i v i s i o n  e a c h  t i m e .  
was reached on t h e  fol lowing d i v i s i o n :  A = 20.81, H = 9.55,  
K = 6.10, L = 8.88, M = 18.72, T = 19-77 .  
The reasoning  behind t h i s  d i v i s i o n ,  worked o u t  mainly by 
p l a y e r s  H and M I  b u t  accepted a f t e r  some arguments by t h e  
o t h e r s ,  was a  th ree-phase  d i v i s i o n  scheme involv ing  hypothet-  
i c a l  c o a l i t i o n s .  
I n  phase 1, one assumed a  c o a l i t i o n  HKL t o  be formed. Th i s  
is t h e  t h r e e  p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  which g e t s  t h e  l a r g e s t  c o s t  
sav ings  compared t o  what t h e  p a r t i e s  can make on t h e i r  own, 
i . e . ,  compared t o  t h e  "one-party" c o a l i t i o n  pay-offs .  These 
sav ings  a r e  then  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n  p ropor t ion  t o  t h e s e  
"one-party" c o a l i t i o n  c o s t s .  The d i v i s i o n  scheme i s  i l l u s t r a -  
t e d  by t a b l e  3  (on Po 1 7 ) -  
I n  phase 2 ,  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  c o a l i t i o n  HKLMT was formed 
with  M and T j o i n i n g  a s  s e p a r a t e  u n i t s  t h e  a l r e a d y  formed co- 
a l i t i o n  HKL.* The "in-coming" c o s t s  i n  phase 2 of H I  K and L 
were t h e  "outgoing" c o s t s  of t h e s e  members i n  phase 1 , w h i l e  
t h e  "in-coming" c o s t s  of M and T were t h e i r  "one -coa l i t i on  
c o s t s . "  The c o s t s  s av ings  c(HKL) + c(M) + c  ( T )  - c(HKLMT) were 
then d i s t r i b u t e d  accord ing  t o  t h e s e  "in-coming" c o s t s  and then  
deducted from t h e  "in-comingu c d s t s "  t o  form "out-going" cos t s . **  
F i n a l l y ,  i n  t h e  t h i r d  and f i n a l  phase ,  p a r t y  A was brought 
i n  and t h e  grand c o a l i t i o n  was formed. The f i v e  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  
went i n  wi th  t h e i r  "outgoing" c o s t s  from phase 2 while  A went 
i n  wi th  h i s  "one-par ty  c o a l i t i o n "  c o s t .  The c o s t  s av ings ,  
c(A)  + c(HKLMT) - c(AHKLMT) w e r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n  
accordance wi th  t h e s e  "in-coming" c o s t s .  The f i n a l  c o s t s  were 
then ob ta ined  by deduc t ing  t h e  c o s t  sav ings  from t h e s e  " i n -  
comingn c o s t s .  
One can formula te  t h i s  procedure  i n  a  g e n e r a l ,  r e c u r s i v e  
manner. I n  a  phase j  + 1, t h e  "o ld"  members, i . e . ,  t h o s e  p a r t i -  
c i p a t i n q  i n  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  a l r e a d y  i n  phase j ,  come i n  wi th  
t h e  "out-going" c o s t s  of phase j. The "in-coming" c o s t s  of t h e  
new members a r e  t h e i r  "one-par ty  c o a l i t i o n "  c o s t s .  The c o s t  
s av ings ,  i. e .  , t h e  sum of t h e  "in-coming" c o s t s  minus t h e  c o s t s  
of t h e  c o a l i t i o n  formed, a r e  then  d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  members i n  
p ropor t ion  t o  t h e i r  "in-coming" c o s t s .  The "outgoing" c o s t s  of 
* I t  i s  somewhat s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  an assumption was made t o  
t h e  j o in ing  of M and T a s  s e p a r a t e  u n i t s  cons ide r ing  t h a t  t h e  
c o a l i t i o c  MT had a l r e a d y  been formed. I t  would have been more 
c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  a c t u a l  behavior  i f  M and T had gone i n t o  phase 
2 with  19.17 and 20.24 ( s e e  page 15) a s  "in-coming" c o s t s  r a t h e r  
than 20.81 and 21.98 (see t a b l e  1).  I f  t h i s  had been t h e  c a s e ,  
M and T would i n  t h e  f i n a l  agreement have pa id  37.24 t o g e t h e r  
i n s t e a d  of 38.49. T h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  i s ,  however, n o t  b i g  enough 
t o  have changed t h e  g e n e r a l  conc lus ions  wi th  regard  t o  t h e  game. 
**c(HKL) denotes  t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  c o a l i t i o n  H K L ,  c(M) t h e  
c o s t s  of M going a lone  e t c .  
of  t h e  members i n  p h a s e  j + 1 a r e  t h e n  o b t a i n e d  by d e d u c t i n g  
t h e  c o s t s  s a v i n g s  f rom t h e  " in -coming"  c o s t s .  
T a b l e  3: A l l o c a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  i n  p h a s e  1. 
Column 1 column 2  Column 3  Column 4  
Incoming c o s t s  P e r c e n t a g e  S a v i n g s  d i s -  Ou tgo ing  c o s t  = 
= o n e  p a r t y  o f  43.87 t r i b u t e d  ac -  Incoming c o s t s  
c o a l i t i o n  c o r d i n g  t o  - s a v i n g s  (column 1 
c o s t s  column 2.  - column 3 )  . 
L 15 .88  36 .2% 6 . 0 1  9 .86  
sum 43.87 1 6 . 6 1  27 .26  
S a v i n g s  1 6 . 6 1  
With t h e  p r o c e d u r e  s t a r t i n g  i n  p h a s e  1 w i t h  a l l  " in -comina"  
c o s t s  a s  " o n c - p a r t y  c o a l i k i o ? "  c o s t s ,  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  i s  u n i q u e l y  
d e f i n e d ,  p r o v i d e d  one  d e f i n e s  which o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  " s i g n  up" i n  
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p h a s e s .  T h i s  s i g n i n g  up  p r o c e d u r e  seemed t o  
f o l l o w  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  which a d d i t i o n s  g a v e  t h e  l a r g e s t  m a r g i n a l  
i n c r e a s e .  
A p r o c e d u r e  l e a d i n g  more d i r e c t l y  i n  e a c h  p h a s e  t o  t h e  same 
r e s u l t ,  b u t  i n v o l v i n g  a  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o n i n g ,  i s  t o  
d i r e c t l y  a l l o c a t e  t h e  c o s t s  o f  t h e  new c o a l i t i o n  t o  t h e  members 
o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  " in -coming"  c o s t s .  T h i s  
method i s  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  known a s  t h e  " J u s t i f i a b l e  e x p e n d i t u r e  
method" .  ( S e e  E c k s t e i n  1958 ,  and  James  and  Lee 1 9 7 1 ) .  I t  c a n  
e a s i l y  b e  s e e n  t h a t  t h i s  p r o c e d u r e  l e a d s  t o  t h e  same r e s u l t ,  i f  
w e  a p p l y  b o t h  p r o c e d u r e s  t o  e . g . ,  a  two p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  c a s e ,  w i t h  
t h e  p a r t i e s  c a l l e d  A and  B. The c o s t s  s a v i n g s  a r e :  
c ( A )  + c ( B )  - c ( A B )  and  A ' s  s h a r e  o f  " in -coming"  c o s t s  a r e :  
Hence : 
x = c ( A )  A ( C  ( A )  
c ( A )  ( c  ( A )  + c ( B )  ) - c ( A)  ( C  ( A)  + c ( B )  - c (AD) ) - 
c ( A )  + c ( B )  - 
which  i s  t h e  f o r m u l a  u s e d  i n  t h e  d i r e c t  a l l o c a t i o n .  
COMPARISON OF METHODS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Having  e x p l a i n e d  how t h e  f i n a l  a g r e e m e n t  w a s  r e a c h e d ,  w e  
c a n  now compare t h e  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  s o l u t i o n  p r o p o s e d  by  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n c e p t s  p r e s e n t e d  a b o v e ,  a n d  w i t h  t h e  
s o l u t i o n  f rom t h e  Swedish  game. I n  o r d e r  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  com- 
p a r i s o n s  w e  sum up  a l l  v a l u e s  i n  t a b l e  4.  
T a b l e  4 .  Compar i sons  o f  d i f f e r e n t  methods  w i t h  ou tcome.  
-- 
C e m a n d p r o p o r t i o n a l  1 3 . 3 3  16 .32  7 .43 7 . 0 0  29.04 10.69 
P o p u l a t i o n  p r o p .  10 .13  21 .00  3.19 8 .22  34.22 7 .07  
SCRB 19.54 1 3 . 2 8  5.62 10 .90  16 .66  17 .82  
S h a p l e y  V a l u e  20 .01  1 0 . 7 1  6 . 6 1  1 0 . 3 7  16.94 1 9 . 1 8  
N u c l e o l u s  20 .35  12 .06  5 . 0 0  8 . 6 1  1 8 . 6 0  1 9 . 2 1  
P r o p  L e a s t  core 1 9 . 8 1  1 2 . 5 7  4 .35  9 .25  1 9 . 8 5  17.99 
Weak L e a s t  Core 20.03  12.52 3.94 9 .07  20 .11  1 8 . 1 5  
Swedish  G a m e  21.15 9 . 7 0  6 . 0 0  9 . 1 0  18 .37  1 9 . 5 0  
I t a l i a n  G a m e  2 0 . 8 1  9 . 5 5  6 . 1 0  8 .88  18 .72  1 9 . 7 7  
A l r e a d y  a b r i e f  g l a n c e  r e v e a l s  how close t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  
I t a l i a n  game are t o  t h o s e  o f  t h e  Swedish  game. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  it 
c a n  b e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  demand f i g u r e s  h a v e  l i t t l e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  t h e  f i n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  make t h e  c o m p a r i s o n s  easier ,  however ,  w e  s h a l l  
u t i l i z e  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  m e a s u r e s  o f  d i f f e r e n c e :  
1 .  The sum o f  a b s o l u t e  d i f f e r e n c e s .  Wi th  Ti as t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
v a l u e  and  E a s  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a l  v a l u e  f o r  p a r t y  i, t h e  
measu re  is:  i 
2 .  The sum o f  t h e  s q u a r e d  d i f f e r e n c e s :  
Compared t o  measu re  1, t h i s  g i v e s  a  h i g h e r  r e l a t i v e  w e i g h t  
t o  l a r g e  d i s c r e ? a n c i e s .  
3. The sum o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s q u a r e d  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  i . e . ,  o f  t h e  
s q u a r e d  d i f f e r e n c e s  a f t e r  d i v i d i n g  e a c h  d i f f e r e n c e  by t h e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  v a l u e :  
The i d e a  b e h i n d  t h i s  measure  i s  t h a t  a  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  more 
i m p o r t a n t  i f  it i s  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  i n  compar ison  w i t h  t h e  
" e x p e c t e d "  v a l u e .  
Apply ing  t h e s e  measu res  t o  t h e  d a t a  i n  t h e  t a b l e  above ,  
we o b t a i n ,  l i s t i n g  t h e  methods i n  o r d e r  o f  s i z e  ( p a i r - w i s e  o f  
a t  l e a s t  two m e a s u r e s ) ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n q  t a b l e  ( T a b l e  5 )  : 
T a b l e  5.  Measured d i f f e r e n c e s  between outcome o f  I t a l i a n  game 
and  d i f f e r e n t  methods.  
D i f f e r e n c e  Measures  
Swedish Game 1 . 4 4  0 .39  0 .07  
S h a p l e y  Va lue  6.34 8 .00  0 .62  
N u c l e o l u s  5 .02 8 .14  0 . 8 0  
P r o p o r t .  L e a s t  Core 9 .06  1 7 . 8 0  1 .74  
Weak L e a s t  Core  9.12 18 .72  2.16 
SCRB 11.52 27 .93  2.02 
Demand P r o p o r t i o n a l  36.87 296.17 19 .14  
P o p u l a t i o n  P r o p o r t i o n a l  53 .90  655.82 50.06 
From t h i s  t a b l e ,  we r e a l l y  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  
t h e  f o r e c a s t  t h a t  t h e  outcome o f  t h e  I t a l i a n  game would be 
t h e  same a s  i n  Sweden. W e  a l s o  see how v e r y  poor  t h e  f o r e c a s t s  
a r e ,  t h a t  t h e  d i v i s i o n  would be  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  demand and popu- 
l a t i o n  f i g u r e s .  
Fur the rmore ,  w e  can s t u d y  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  more 
t h e o r e t i c a l  methods. The r a n k i n g  o r d e r  h e r e  i s  t h e  same a s  i n  
t h e  Swedish c a s e .  I t  i s  of  i n t e r e s t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  Shapley  
Value i s  on t o p ,  s l i g h t l y  ahead of  t h e  N u c l e o l u s ,  w h i l e  t h e  
Weak L e a s t  Core ,  which from t h e  normat ive  p o i n t  o f  v iew had t h e  
most d e s i r a b l e  p r o p e r t i e s ,  comes a t  t h e  bot tom among t h e  game 
t h e o r e t i c  methods. The SCRB i s ,  however,  on two measures  of  
d i f f e r e n c e ,  worse t h a n  t h e  Weak L e a s t  Core.  
I t  s h o u l d ,  however,  be  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  game t h e o r e t i c  
methods a r e  a l l  f a i r l y  c l o s e  t o g e t h e r ,  as can  be  s e e n  by t h e  
l a r g e  jump t o  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n s  based  on demand. 
F i n a l l y ,  one  can  t e s t  whether  t h e  outcome l i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  
c o r e .  S i n c e  t h e  g rand  c o a l i t i o n  h a s  been formed and t h e  d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n s  add up t o  t h e  g rand  t o t a l * ,  it remains  t o  t e s t  t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  group r a t i o n a l i t y ,  i . e . ,  t o  see i f  some se t  of  
p l a y e r s  c o u l d  have g o t t e n  more by forming a  c o a l i t i o n  on t h e i r  
own. One t h e n  f i n d s  t h a t  t h e  g roup  r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  indeed  
v i o l a t e d .  A,K,L,M and T  t o g e t h e r  have t o  pay 74.28,  b u t  by 
forming t h e  c o a l i t i o n  AKLMT, t h e y  c o u l d  have g o t t e n  away w i t h  
73.97, a s  seen  from T a b l e  1. T h i s  i s ,  however,  t h e  o n l y  v i o l a -  
t i o n  of t h e  c o r e  c o n c e p t .  
I t  shou ld  be  ment ioned t h a t  i n  t h e  Swedish game, t h e  c o r e  
concep t  would have a l s o  been v i o l a t e d  o n l y  o n c e ,  and a l s o  w i t h  
r e g a r d  t o  AKLMT, s i n c e  t h e s e  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  Swedish game would 
have had t o  pay a  t o t a l  o f  74.12."" 
The reason  f o r  t h e s e  v i o l a t i o n s  of  t h e  c o r e  c o n c e p t ,  i s  t h e  
s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  H seems t o  have i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e  o f  t h e  
game. * * *  S i n c e  H t h e r e f o r e  p e t s  away w i t h  a  lower  c o s t ,  t h e  re- 
maining p a r t i e s  have t o  pay more. A t  a l a t e r  s t a g e  o f  t h e  game 
when t h e  g rand  c o a l i t i o n  i s  formed,  t h e  i d e a  of e x c l u d i n g  H 
d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  anybody ' s  mind. 
COMMENTS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE GAME 
The most s t r i k i n g  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  game was t h e  c l o s e n e s s  of  
t h e  outcome t o  t h e  game i n  Sweden. There  a-re two main r e a s o n s  
*S ince  t h e  a c t u a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  f a c t  concerned one more 
dec imal  t h a n  g i v e n  h e r e ,  t h e  t o t a l  adds  up t o  83.83 i n s t e a d  of 
83.82 due t o  rounding o f f  e r r o r s .  
* * I f  t h e  f i n a l  c o a l i t i o n  had been formed,  see f o o t n o t e  on 
page 14. 
***This  w i l l  be  commented on below (page  2 1 ) .  
f o r  t h i s  c l o s e n e s s .  The f i r s t  o n e  i s  t h a t  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  
c o s t s  o f  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  w e r e  i n  b o t h  c a s e s  b a s e d  on a  pro-  
c e d u r e  i n v o l v i n g  ( t h e  r e a l  o r  h y p o t h e t i c a l )  f o r m a t i o n  of  s u c c e s -  
s i v e l v  l a r g e r  c o a l i t i o n s ,  w i t h  HKL f i r s t  b e i n g  formed,  t h e n  HKLMT, 
and  f i n a l l y  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n .  The second  r e a s o n  i s  t h e  f o l l o w -  
i n g :  The i m p o r t a n t  d i v i s i o n  problem c o n c e r n s  t h e  HKL c o a l i t i o n  
s i n c e  it i s  h e r e  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t  c o s t  s a v i n g s  a r e  o b t a i n e d .  I n  
b o t h  t h e  Swedish  a n d  t h e  I t a l i a n  games,  t h e  same d i v i s i o n  was 
o b t a i n e d ;  i n  Sweden b y  d i r e c t l y  u s i n g  t h e  " j u s t i f i a b l e  expend i -  
t u r e  method";  i n  I t a l y  by u s i n g  a  method l e a d i n g  t o  i d e n t i c a l  
r e s u l t s .  
The s e c o n d  i m p o r t a n t  r e s u l t  w a s  t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  a l l o c a t i o n s  
were n o t  b a s e d  on demand o r  p o p u l a t i o n .  T h i s  was s u r p r i s i n g  t o  
t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a  l o n g  d i s c u s s i o n  between t h e  qaming 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e s e  f i q u r e s  s h o u l d  m a t t e r .  
The p o s i t i o n  o f  t h o s e  who w e r e  a r g u i n g  f o r  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  
demand and  p o p u l a t i o n  was ,  however ,  weakened by t h e i r  u n c e r t a i n t y  
a s  t o  w h e t h e r  demand o r  p o p u l a t i o n  o r  some c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  
f i g u r e s  s h o u l d  b e  u s e d  a s  an  a l l o c a t i o n  c r i t e r i o n .  One wonders  
w h e t h e r  t h e i r  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  would have  been  d i f f e r e n t  i f  
w e  had o n l y  s u p p l i e d ,  e . g . ,  t h e  demand f i g u r e s .  * 
F i n a l l y ,  w e  n o t i c e d  t h a t  a s  i n  t h e  Swedish  game, t h e  S h a p l e y  
p r o c e d u r e  f a r e d  b e s t  among t h e  game t h e o r e t i c  m o d e l s ,  c l o s e l y  
f o l l o w e d  by  t h e  N u c l e o l u s ,  w h i l e  t h e  Weak L e a s t  Core  had  t h e  
p o o r e s t  r e s u l t s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  Weak L e a s t  Core  g i v e s  t o o  
low a  v a l u e  t o  K t  b u t  t o o  h i g h  a  v a l u e  f 0 r . H  a n d  M. I n  f a c t ,  
a l l  methods  o v e r e s t i m a t e  t h e  c o s t  t o  b e  p a i d  by H I  b u t  f o r  t h e  
S h a p l e y  v a l u e  t h i s  e r r o r  i s  n o t  s o  l a r g e .  
The problem o f  H i s  o f  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t ,  s i n c e  o n e  o f  t h e  
p l a y e r s  a f t e r  t h e  game, p o i n t e d  o u t  t h e  s t r o n g  s t r a t e g i c  p o s i -  
t i o n  o f  H I  e s p e c i a l l y  a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  
c o a l i t i o n  HKL. S i n c e  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  KL d o e s  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  any  
s a v i n g s ,  w h i l e  t h e  c o a l i t i o n s  HK and  E!T, r e s u l t  i n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
s a v i n g s ,  H h a s  a  s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n  a s  r e g a r d s  the  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  
c o s t  s a v i n g s  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  HKL. T h i s  f a c t  
p l a y s ,  however ,  a  v e r y  s m a l l  r o l e  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  s o l u t i o n  methods  
b a s e d  on t h e  coreA*, s i n c e  a l l  c o a l i t i o n  p a y - o f f s  a r e  u s e d  a s  
c o n s t r a i n t s  on an  e q u a l  b a s i s ,  and  t h e  c o r e  d o e s  n o t  t a k e  t h e  
s u c c e s s i v e  c o a l i t i o n  f o r m i n g  p r o c e s s  i n t o  a c c o u n t .  The p r o c e -  
d u r e  u s e d  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  S h a p l e y  v a l u e  c o m p r i s e s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  
hand ,  a  scheme f o r  t h e  s u c c e s s i v e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  c o a l i t i o n s ,  a n d  
one  can wonder t o  what  e x t e n t  t h i s  a c c o u n t s  f o r  t h e  somewhat 
b e t t e r  p r e d i c t i v e  power o f  t h e  S h a p l e y  Va lue .  
* ~ t  s h o u l d  b e  men t ioned  t h a t  i n  t h e  Swedish  game, w e  d i d  
n o t  s u p p l y  any  f i g u r e s  on  p o p u l a t i o n  and  demand. 
**The N u c l e o l u s ,  t h e  P r o p o r t i o n a l  L e a s t  Core  and  t h e  Weak 
L e a s t  Core .  
IDEAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
AS s t r e s s e d  a l r e a d y  i n  S t a h l  ( 1980 ) ,  a  g r e a t  many games 
would be  r e q u i r e d  t o  draw any more g e n e r a l  c o n c l u s i o n s .  Two 
game r uns  a r e  o b v i o u s l y  f a r  from enough. The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  Swedish and I t a l i a n  games were s o  c l o s e ,  g i v e s ,  
however, a d d i t i o n a l  s t i m u l u s  t o  renewed p l a y i n g  o f  t h e  game. .  
The p r e s e n t  game g i v e s  some d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  set up o f  
f u r t h e r  gaming exper iments .  A s  d i s c u s s e d  above,  t h e  d i v i s i o n s  
t o  no e x t e n t  r e f l e c t e d  demand o r  popu l a t i on  f i g u r e s ,  a l t hough  
some p a r t i e s  agreed  t h i s  shou ld  be t h e  c a s e .  They w e r e ,  
however, u n c e r t a i n  a s  t o  whether  demand o r  p o p u l a t i o n  f i q u r e s ,  
o r  a  combination of  t h e s e ,  shou ld  m a t t e r .  Hence, it would be  
i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  see i f  t h e r e  would be  any d i f f e r e n c e ,  i f ,  e . g . ,  
o n l y  d a t a  on demand was g iven .  
A f t e r  t h e  p l a y i n g  o f  t h e  Swedish game, we a l s o  sugges t ed  
some i d e a s  f o r  f u r t h e r  t h e o r e t i c a l  work.* One concerned a modi- 
f i c a t i o n  of t h e  Shapley v a l u e ;  a n o t h e r  concerned work i n  t h e  
e x t e n s i v e  form. The d i v i s i o n  scheme used i n  t h e  I t a l i a n  game 
a l s o  b r i n g s  o u t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l evancy  o f  u s i n g  t h e  c o r e  
concept  o n l y  f o r  t h e  grand c o a l i t i o n .  An a l t e r n a t i v e  p rocedure  
would be t o  u se  some c o r e  concep t  i n  a  f i r s t  phase  f o r  t h e  
d i v i s i o n  of  t h e  c o s t s  of  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  HKL.  The same k i n d  of  
d i v i s i o n  concept  would t h e n  app ly  t o  MT. One would t h e n  re- 
app ly  t h i s  concep t  t o  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  HKLMT,  s e e i n g  it  a s  a  two- 
p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  c o n s i s t i n g  of t h e  new p a r t i e s  HKL and MT. T h i s  
would, e . g . ,  de te rmine  t h e  c o s t s  o f  t h e  two groups ,  HKL and MT. 
The same procedure  would t hen  f i n a l l y  be used when b r i n g i n q  i n  
A t o  form t h e  g rand  c o a l i t i o n  AHKLHT. The c o s t s  t h u s  a s s igned  
t o  e . g . ,  HKLMT a s  a  g roup  would t h e n  be a l l o c a t e d  t o  HKL and MT, 
i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  how t h e  c o s t s  of  HKLMT were d i v i d e d  i n  t h e  
p receed ing  phase .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  c o s t s  a s s i g n e d  t o  e . g . ,  HKL a s  
a  group,  would be  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  members H ,  K ,  and L 
i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  how t h e  o r i g i n a l  c o s t s  of HKL were a l l o c a t e d  
t o  i t s  members i n  t h e  f i r s t  phase .  
--- - 
*See S t a h l  (1980) page 26 
APPENDIX: GAME INSTRUCTIONS 
You have been invited to participate in a simple game. 
The game concerns the allocation of costs in a water pro- 
ject. This project aims at bringing stimulating liquid to six 
municipalities. You will represent one of these. On this 
occasion, as the sole representative of this municipality, you 
will represent both the producer and the consumer side. 
You will participate in this project either completely on 
your own, or in cooperation with one or several of the other 
participants in the game, who are acting as representatives 
for other municipalities. 
All in all, representatives of six municipalities, called 
A, H I  K, L, M I  and T, participate in the game. All participants 
(= municipalities) must in some way take part in the water 
project, but their costs will depend on how they form coalitions 
with other participants. 
Should a municipality not enter into coalition with any 
other municipality, it will pay that sum in the allocated table 
which represents what each municipality would be obligated to 
pay if acting alone. Prior to the start of the game, each 
player, 1.e. each representative of a municipality, will receive 
this sum in cash from the game leader. 
Each player can, however, by acting skillfully both during 
the formation of coalitions and during the allocation of the 
total costs within the coalition, get away with a lower payment, 
in some cases, a considerably lower one. 
The player may keep this surplus for himself (or if he 
wishes to do so, may donate it at the end of the game to a 
charitable purpose). 
The details of the game are as follows: 
By lottery, each player is assigned the role of the repre- 
sentative of one of the six municipalities. Next each player 
obtains the aforementioned sum of money corresponding to the 
maximum amount that he might have to pay, should he participate 
in the water project completely on his own. After this, the 
players sit down around the table and the coalition-formation 
negotiations can begin. 
The players then must try to form coalitions and reach 
agreement on how much each of the participants in the formed 
coalition shall pay of the total cost to the whole coalition. 
This total cost for each possible coalition is seen in the 
attached table. 
As soon as the first coalition has been formed and agree- 
ment has been reached as to the allocation of the total costs 
of this coalition among its members, they register the coali- 
tion with the game director. He will then record the names of 
the coalition participants,as well as the payment each of them 
would make toward the total costs of the coalition. Once a 
coalition has been registered, its content, i.e. the participants 
and the cost allocation, is announced to all participants of 
the game. 
A coalition does not come i n r ~  force, however, until 15 
minutes have elapsed since its registration, and then only 
provided that none of its members has been registered in another 
coalition during this period. Hence a player can leave one 
coalition and join another in order to decrease the amount of 
his payment. Furthermore, a coalition dissolves by registering 
a new coalition with additional members. For new coalitions, 
the rule still applies that it does not come into force until it 
has been registered unchanged for 15 minutes. 
Once a coalition has come into force, each of its members 
pays the game leader the amount agreed upon at the time of 
the registration. These participants then cease to take an 
active part in the game, but may remain at the table if they 
wish to do so. 
The game continues in this way until all participants are 
members of a coalition which has come into force (with the possi- 
ble exception of a single "leftover" participant). Should the 
game continue more than 90 minutes from the time of its start, 
i t  w i l l  b e  b r o u g h t  t o  a n  end  a n d  t h o s e  c o a l i t i o n s  r e g i s t e r e d  
( b u t  n o t  b r o k e n )  a t  t h e  t i m e  w i l l  come i n t o  f o r c e .  
F i n a l l y  it s h o u l d  b e  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  game a i m s  a t  b r i n g i n g  
o u t  some a s p e c t s  o f  o n e  o f  t h e  p a p e r s  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e .  
Hence i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  you  t r y  a s  much a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  a c t  
a s  o n e  c o u l d  e x p e c t  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f o r  a  m u n i c i p a l i t y  to  act  
d u r i n g  s u c h  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  whe re  t h e  economic  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  
m u n i c i p a l i t y  a r e  a t  s t a k e .  











































DATA ON POPULATION AND DEMAND 
A H K L M T 
3  P o p u l a t i o n  ( 1 0  ) 85 .0  176 .3  26 .8  6 9 . 0  2 8 7 . 3  5 9 . 5  
Demand : ( ~ r n ) / ~ r )  6 .72  8 . 2 3  3 . 7 5  3 .53  14 .64  5 .39  
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